Substrate Independence of Information: From Knowledge Organization to the Problem of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind and Artificial Intelligence

Noruzi, Alireza Substrate Independence of Information: From Knowledge Organization to the Problem of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind and Artificial Intelligence. Academic Librarianship and Information Research, 2025, vol. 59, n. 4, pp. 1-16. [Journal article (Paginated)]

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English abstract

The concept of “substrate independence” is one of the most fundamental concepts in information science, computer science, and the philosophy of mind. It has played a decisive role in the transition from traditional librarianship to modern information science, as well as in the formation of new paradigms in artificial intelligence (AI). This concept emphasizes the distinction between “information as an abstract entity” and “the material substrate of its manifestation,” defining information not as a physical object but as an “abstract pattern.” This study, adopting an analytical approach, elucidates this concept at four main levels: 1. The level of information science, encompassing the separation of content from carrier, the transformation of knowledge organization systems and metadata, and the redefinition of the role of information professionals; 2. The interdisciplinary level, including publishing, music, and computation; 3. The level of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind, including the mind-as-software thesis and mind uploading; and 4. The level of theoretical and practical challenges, including the problem of consciousness, the embodiment problem, ethical challenges, and physical limitations. The findings indicate that although substrate independence has become an efficient managerial tool in information science, its generalization to the domain of consciousness and artificial intelligence entails profound philosophical, technical, and ethical questions. This concept is not merely a theoretical principle but also a dynamic and challenging research domain within contemporary sciences. The concept of substrate independence, as a foundational principle of contemporary information science, has, by separating abstract content from its physical carrier, paved the way for the transformation of modern knowledge organization systems, metadata, and digital preservation strategies. However, the generalization of this principle to the domain of consciousness and artificial intelligence raises unresolved questions regarding the nature of understanding, the role of embodiment in cognition, and individual identity in digital environments. Thus, this concept not only provides a theoretical framework for information management in multi-format environments but also opens up an interdisciplinary research field requiring collaboration among information scientists, computer scientists, neuroscientists, and philosophers to explore its epistemological, technical, and ethical dimensions.

Item type: Journal article (Paginated)
Keywords: substrate independence, information science, knowledge organization, metadata, digital preservation, artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, consciousness
Subjects: A. Theoretical and general aspects of libraries and information. > AB. Information theory and library theory.
Depositing user: Dr. Alireza Noruzi
Date deposited: 31 Aug 2026 17:19
Last modified: 31 Aug 2026 17:19
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10760/48489

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