Teorii cauzale ale referinței

Sfetcu, Nicolae Teorii cauzale ale referinței. Cunoașterea Științifică, 2023, vol. 2, n. 2, pp. 119-122. [Journal article (Paginated)]

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Alternative locations: https://doi.org/10.58679/CS90935

English abstract

Descriptivist theories attempted to eliminate certain logical contradictions if names were considered definite descriptions. Kripke rejected the validity of these descriptivist theories by arguing that there is no need for a unique description of identity, identifying descriptions can be used even if the referent has not been correctly identified, and a description (as opposed to a name) cannot function as a rigid signifier. Later, descriptivist theories extended this idea of defined description to a set of descriptions or a weighted average of these descriptions.

Romanian abstract

Teoriile descriptiviste au încercat să elimine anumite contradicții logice dacă numele erau considerate descrieri definite. Kripke a respins valabilitatea acestor teoriile descriptiviste argumentând că nu este nevoie de o descriere unică a identității, se pot utiliza descrieri identificatoare chiar dacă referința nu a fost identificată corect, și o descriere (spre deosebire de un nume) nu poate funcționa ca indicator rigid. Ulterior, teoriile descriptiviste au extins această idee a descrierii definite la un set de descrieri sau o medie ponderată a acestor descrieri.

Item type: Journal article (Paginated)
Keywords: teorii cauzale, referință, nume proprii, Saul Kripke
Subjects: B. Information use and sociology of information > BG. Information dissemination and diffusion.
Depositing user: Nicolae Sfetcu
Date deposited: 20 Feb 2024 13:58
Last modified: 20 Feb 2024 13:58
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10760/45575

References

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deRosset, Louis. 2011. “The Causal-Historical Theory of Reference.” http://www.uvm.edu/~lderosse/courses/nnn/caus_theor.pdf.

Donnellan, Keith S. 1972. “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions.” In Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, 356–79. Synthese Library. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_10.

Evans, Gareth, and J. E. J. Altham. 1973. “The Causal Theory of Names.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 47: 187–225. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106912.

Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.

Kripke, Saul A. 1979. “A Puzzle About Belief.” In Meaning and Use, edited by A. Margalit, 239–83. Reidel.

Lewis, David. 1984. “Putnam’s Paradox.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3): 221–236.

Mill, John Stuart. 1882. “A System of Logic.” 1882. https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/system_of_logic/.

Psillos, Stathis. 1999. Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Routledge.

Putnam, Hilary. 1973. “Meaning and Reference.” The Journal of Philosophy 70 (19): 699–711. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025079.

Searle, John R. 1958. “Proper Names.” Mind 67 (266): 166–73. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108.


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